

Chapter 1—Assignment A

Chapter 1—Questions and Case study

Below are 11 questions, answer any four (4) of the Discussion Questions. Type in Times New Roman, size 12 font, single space.

1. Define each of the following:
 - a. Change agent system
 - b. Initiator system
 - c. Client system
 - d. Target system
 - e. Action system
2. Define: (a) need, and (b) problem.
3. Define: (a) incidence, and (b) prevalence.
4. What techniques can we use to estimate the degree and seriousness of a problem? Describe each method of documenting the need for change: (a) key informant approach, (b) community forum, (c) community survey, and (d) social indicators.
5. What does it mean to say that a problem is "socially constructed"? Give an example.
6. (a) Define etiology, (b) Describe the five levels of etiology, and give an example of each
7. Define theory.
8. What is a systems analysis? Describe the five steps in a criminal justice systems analysis. Use examples to illustrate your understanding of these concepts.
9. Discuss different types of barriers to change and give an example of each: (a) physical, (b) social, (c) economic, (d) educational, (e) political, (f) legal, and (g) technological.
10. (a) Define force field analysis, (b) Describe each of the three steps.
11. Define action research

Assignment A is **due Feb. 8, 2019**

Assignment B was also taken from Chapter 1 it involves a police shooting in Philadelphia
Due Feb 15, 2019

Chapter 1—Assignment B—Program evaluation/assessment No. 1

Case Study 1.2 Officer-Involved Shootings in Philadelphia³

Instructions: Read the case study below and answer the questions that follow.

Police use of deadly force is the most serious action a police officer can take. Events in 2014 in Ferguson, Staten Island, Cleveland, and Baton Rouge have brought these issues to the national spotlight and uncovered significant strife between some communities and their law enforcement. Protest movements have spread across the country with profound mantras such as “Black lives matter,” “Hands up, don’t shoot,” and “I can’t breathe.”

In 2013, amidst a drop in violent crimes and assaults against the police, the number of Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) officer-involved shootings (OIS) was on the rise, as was the number of fatal OISs. Around the same time, Commissioner Charles C. Ramsey requested technical assistance from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) through the Collaborative Reform Initiative. The COPS Office and the PPD established the goal to examine and reform deadly force policies, practices, and related processes in the PPD, taking into account national standards, best practices, current and emerging research, and community expectations.

We lay the groundwork for understanding OISs in Philadelphia by presenting a descriptive analysis of incidents occurring from 2007 to 2013. We frame our analysis around the following interrogatives: when, where, who, and how? In doing so, we present a comprehensive examination of the time and location of OISs. We also examine the individuals involved—officers and suspects—and the dynamics of the encounter. We give special attention to the issue of race and threat perception, examining these factors both independently and together. For the purpose of our assessment, we define an OIS as any firearm discharge that meets the following criteria:

- ☐ The individual discharging the firearm is a sworn officer.
- ☐ The individual discharging the firearm may be on duty or off duty.
- ☐ The discharge of the firearm involves another human being.
- ☐ The discharge of the firearm is intentional (unless someone other than the officer is injured; discharges in which someone other than the officer is injured are also counted as OISs even if the discharge is accidental).

Between 2007 and 2014, there were 394 OISs in the PPD, with an annual average of 49. The 22nd and 25th police districts of Philadelphia experienced the most OISs in our study period. Looking across the entire city, we found that patterns of gun-related violent crimes and homicides in Philadelphia’s police districts correlate with the prevalence of OISs.

OISs mostly involved three or fewer officers. The vast majority (94 percent) of officers involved in shootings were men. The majority (59 percent) of officers were white, whereas 34 percent were black, 7 percent were Hispanic, and less than 1 percent were Asian. Officers were 33 years old, on average, and usually in a patrol function. Although patrol officers have the greatest number of OISs, when controlling for the size of different PPD units, the highway patrol, major crimes unit, and narcotics strike force had the highest rates of OISs.

The average age of suspects was 20 years old. The racial composition of suspects in OISs was 81 percent black, 9 percent Hispanic, 8 percent white, and 2 percent Asian. Suspects were unarmed in 15 percent of OISs. Suspects were armed with firearms 56 percent of the time; used vehicles as weapons 9 percent of the time; were armed with a sharp object 8 percent of the time; were armed with a BB gun 3 percent of the time; and were armed with a blunt object 3 percent of the time. In 6 percent of cases, whether the suspect was armed has not been determined.

Unarmed OIS incidents were mostly attributable to one of two factors: threat perception failures and physical altercations. Threat perception failures occur when the officer(s) perceives a suspect as being armed due to the misidentification of a nonthreatening object (e.g., a cell phone) or movement (e.g., tugging at the waistband). This was the case in 49 percent of unarmed incidents. Physical altercations refer to incidents in which the suspect reached for the officer's firearm or overwhelmed the officer with physical force. This was the case in 35 percent of unarmed OISs. The remaining unarmed incidents involved toy guns (10 percent), unarmed accomplices (3 percent), and accidental discharge (2 percent).

White suspects were unarmed in 8 of 32 OISs (25 percent). Black suspects were unarmed in 45 of 285 OISs (15.8 percent). Hispanic suspects were unarmed in five of 34 OISs (14.7 percent). And Asian suspects were unarmed in one of five OISs (20 percent). Looking more closely at OISs shows that black suspects in OISs were the most likely to be the subject of a threat perception failure (8.8 percent) and white suspects in OISs were the most likely (18.8 percent) to be involved in a physical altercation resulting in an OIS. We also examined the race of involved officers in threat perception failure OISs to gain a greater understanding of how cross-race encounters may influence threat perception. We found that the threat perception failure rate for white officers and black suspects was 6.8 percent. Black officers had a threat perception failure rate of 11.4 percent when the suspect was black. The threat perception failure rate for Hispanic officers was 16.7 percent when involved in an OIS with a black suspect.

Use of force policies

We reviewed all PPD policies as they relate to deadly force, focusing primarily on directives 10 and 22, because they are the policies specific to use of force. Our review of these policies focused on the following characteristics: consistency with training practice and other policies; consistency with best and emerging practices, research literature, and the department's unique needs; court decisions; and the importance of officer and public

safety. We make a total of 10 findings and 19 recommendations. Following are three key findings and seven recommendations for PPD policy from the report.

Finding: PPD officers do not receive regular, consistent training on the department's deadly force policy (Finding 1).

Recommendation: The PPD should develop a standard training module on directives 10 and 22 and require all sworn personnel to complete the training on an annual basis (Recommendation 1.1).

Recommendation: The PPD should engage with officers and supervisors at the patrol level to seek their input on the clarity and comprehensibility of the department's use of force directives (Recommendation 1.2).

Finding: The PPD requires officers to complete crisis intervention training (CIT) in order to obtain an electronic control weapon (ECW). This requirement conflates the two tactical approaches and limits the distribution of less-lethal tools throughout the department (Finding 8).

Recommendation: The PPD should decouple ECWs and CIT both conceptually and operationally (Recommendation 8.1).

Recommendation: ECWs should be standard-issue weapons for all PPD officers assigned to uniformed enforcement units (Recommendation 8.2).

Recommendation: All PPD officers in uniformed enforcement units should be required to carry ECWs on their duty belts at all times (Recommendation 8.3).

Finding: The PPD's drafted ECW policy is not detailed enough regarding the circumstances in which use of the tool should be limited (Finding 9).

Recommendation: The PPD's ECW policy should limit the number of cycles used per subject to three (Recommendation 9.1).

Recommendation: The PPD's use of force decision chart policy should clearly illustrate where using ECWs is appropriate and inappropriate (Recommendation 9.2).

Chapter 1 Questions

1. Describe the need for change. Why was this analysis conducted?
2. What types of social indicators were examined? Give at least two examples.
3. Unarmed OIS incidents were mostly attributable to two factors: describe each.
4. What are some practical implications of this analysis? For example, how might actual responses to calls for service by police be affected?

Due date Feb. 15, 2019